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DETERMINING AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
Amanda Whitfort*
This article compares the administration of indeterminate sentences in Hong Kong
with developing practices in the United Kingdom and critiques the Hong Kong
decisions in the light of recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. The
author explains that while the Hong Kong courts have ruled on some aspects of the
constitutional validity of an indeterminate sentence, the ultimate question of the
Chief Executive's power to detain prisoners after a recommendation of the Long
Term Prison Sentences Review Board to substitute a determinate sentence for an
indeterminate one has yet to be addressed. The author concludes that should the
Chief Executive's right to effectively determine the release date of life-sentenced
prisoners be challenged, it would likely be judged invalid for inconsistency with the
Bill of Rights and the Basic Law.
Introduction
On 16 July 2002 the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal considered a chal-
lenge to the constitutional validity of the current sentence for the offence of
murder. The appeal in Lau Cheong and Another v HKSAR' challenged the
validity of the mandatory penalty for murder: life imprisonment. That appeal
failed. On 9 September this year the High Court, in the cases of Yau Kwong
Man v Secretary for Security and Lai Hung Wai v Secretary for Security,2 consid-
ered a challenge to the validity of domestic law as applied to two prisoners
currently held at the Executive's discretion. That application was partially
successful. Using those cases as examples, this article compares Hong Kong's
administration of indeterminate (life) sentences with the development of
current practices in the United Kingdom. It critiques Hong Kong's laws in
the light of recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
which have required the United Kingdom to amend its domestic law. The
paper concludes with an assessment of whether the powers currently utilised
in Hong Kong to detain prisoners serving indeterminate sentences are in
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I [2002] 3 HKC 146 (hereinafter referred to as Lau's case).
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compliance with the requirements of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance' (HKBoR) and the Basic Law.
The Administration of Indeterminate Sentences in Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
pursuant to section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance.4 A dis-
cretionary sentence of life imprisonment can also be ordered for persons
convicted of serious offences such as attempted murder, rape and robbery. A
discretionary life sentence is usually reserved for exceptionally repugnant ex-
amples of an offence.s To warrant a discretionary life sentence, the prisoner
must usually also be considered a danger to the public. In developing the well
known sentencing precedent R v Hodgson,6 the English Court of Criminal
Appeal considered a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment as justifiable
where three conditions were met:
1 the offence or offences are in themselves grave enough to require a
very long sentence;
2 it appears from the nature of the offence or offences from the offender's
history that he is a person of unstable character likely to commit such
offences in the future; and
3 if such offences were committed, the consequences to others might be
especially injurious, as in the case of sexual offences or crimes of
violence.
The Hodgson criteria were adopted in Hong Kong in the case of R v Fong
Lung-fail in 1968.
Life imprisonment, however, does not generally mean the prisoner will
spend the term of his natural life in gaol. For the discretionary life-sentenced
prisoner, a minimum term to be served before release is set by the trial judge
at sentencing in accordance with section 67B of the Criminal Procedure
Ordinance.' For the mandatory life-sentenced prisoner, no minimum term is
set, but the prisoner may still be released under procedures applicable to both
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In Hong Kong, prior to July 1997 the practice for determining the mini-
mum term for a prisoner sentenced to discretionary life was similar to that
utilised in the United Kingdom until 1991. No minimum period was set in
open court. The trial judge provided the Governor with his view of the mini-
mum sentence the prisoner could serve in the interests of retribution and
deterrence. The Governor determined any remission of sentence. The Gov-
ernor was advised by the Board of Review of Long Term Prison Sentences,
which was charged with the review of the continued detention of life-sen-
tenced prisoners. The board had no power to require the Governor to release
prisoners, it only made recommendations on the Governor's exercise of the
prerogative to commute or remit sentences. o
In 1997 the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Board was established
under the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance. One of its func-
tions is to review cases of mandatory and discretionary life-sentenced prisoners
and provide recommendations to the Chief Executive where the board con-
siders an indeterminate sentence should be replaced with a determinate one.
If he accepts the board's recommendation, the Chief Executive may com-
mute the sentence in accordance with his powers under Article 48(12) of the
Basic Law. Article 48(12) provides the Chief Executive with the power to
pardon persons convicted of criminal offences or commute their penalties.
In addition to making recommendations to the Chief Executive regarding
the replacement of an indeterminate sentence with a determinate one, the
board may order a prisoner serving a life sentence be released conditionally
under supervision." The board has reported in the First Report of the Long-
Term Prison Sentences Review Board that it will exercise this power when it
considers it too early to recommend to the Chief Executive the substitution
of a determinate sentence for an indeterminate one.'" A conditional release
order would allow the prisoner release for up to two years - the legislation
allows the period to be further extended," although release will be subject to
conditions including, but not limited to, places of residence and employment,
limits on associations and imposition of curfews.'I The completion of a con-
ditional release without breach may result in the board recommending that
the Chief Executive substitute a determinate sentence.15 The board may also,
where the Chief Executive has agreed to replace an indeterminate sentence
with a determinate one, order the release of the prisoner if he has served two-
thirds of the replacement determinate sentence. 16
10 See n 1 above, p 171.
1 Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance, s 15(1)(b).
12 First Report of the Long-Term Prison Sentences Review Board (June 1997-June 2000), p 3.
1 Note 11 above, s 15(4).
14 lbid., s 18.
15 lbid., s 2L
16 ibid., ss 15(1)(c) and 29.
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The Discretionary Life-sentenced Prisoner (Hong Kong)
Since 1997, under section 67B of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, a trial
judge who imposes a discretionary life sentence on a prisoner must specify, in
open court, a minimum period to be served. The board may not allow a pris-
oner release on a two-year conditional release order or under supervision - in
cases where the Chief Executive has approved a determinate sentence - until
this minimum term of imprisonment has expired.'" For a prisoner already
serving a discretionary life sentence or still being held at Her Majesty's plea-
sure at the time of the change of sovereignty in 1997, no minimum period
had been specified. Until 1993, persons under the age of 18 and convicted of
murder could be held at Her Majesty's pleasure on an indeterminate sentence.
Accordingly, section 67C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was enacted
allowing that a minimum period for these prisoners would be set by the Chief
Executive after receiving recommendations from the Chief Justice.
The first review by the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Board to
consider whether to recommend to the Chief Executive substitution of a de-
terminate sentence takes place after a prisoner has been in prison for five
years. Even the completion of the minimum term specified by the trial judge
under section 67B or section 67C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance will
not immediately qualify a prisoner for a recommendation for a determinate
sentence. In the case of HKSAR v Hui Chi Wai and Others,"8 the Court of
Appeal stated that a minimum period assessed under section 67B:
"is not designed to provide a sentence of imprisonment in lieu, as it were,
of a life term. It is designed to draw from the court a minimum term in
years which the convicted person must actually serve before release, re-
membering however ... that it is inherent in the phrase 'minimum term'
that the court does not say that this is the stage at which the convicted
individual is to be, or even should be, released."
The court noted that in exercising its powers under section 67B a court would
not be in a position to address all the issues which a Board of Review would,
at a later stage, be required to take into account to assess whether the pris-
oner had rehabilitated and a recommendation for a determinate sentence
should be made. That being so, the court stated that the scheme described
under the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance, as well as com-
mon sense, suggested that when deciding upon a minimum term under section
67B the court was primarily addressing the punitive and deterrent element
dictated by the offence and the circumstances of the offender at the date
17 Ibid., s 15(3).
18 Unrep., CACC No 78 of 1999 (CA, 13 Nov 2001).
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of sentencing. 9 This view is mirrored by the board, which provides in its
report:
"The minimum terms (so determined) would assist the Board to consider
when determinate sentences should be recommended for prisoners. How-
ever it does not necessarily follow from completion of a minimum term
that consideration would have to be given to commuting the indetermi-
nate sentence by that time. The merits of each case and other relevant
factors would also have to be considered."20
Should the board determine that the prisoner has been rehabilitated it may
recommend to the Chief Executive that he substitute a determinate sen-
tence for an indeterminate one in accordance with its powers under section
15(1)(a)(ii) of the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance. Sec-
tion 15(1)(a) provides:
"When reviewing the sentence of a prisoner in accordance with this Part,
the Board may do such of the following as it considers appropriate-
(a) Make a recommendation that the Chief Executive should-
(i) remit all or part of a prisoner's determinate sentence by substi-
tuting a shorter determinate sentence; or
(ii) substitute a determinate sentence for a prisoner's indeterminate
sentence."
Along with the recommendation, the board also suggests the appropriate
determinate sentence, taking into account the circumstances of the case. If
accepted by the Chief Executive, the determinate sentence suggested will
usually be followed by the prisoner's release under supervision a short time
later." Where a life sentence has been converted to a determinate one and
the prisoner has served not less than two-thirds of it the board may order his
release under supervision.22
The Mandatory Life-sentenced Prisoner (Hong Kong)
For mandatory life-sentenced prisoners in Hong Kong no minimum period is
set by the trial judge in open court. Rather, section 67B(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Ordinance states that the judge may, when imposing a mandatory
19 Ibid.
20 See n 12 above, p 18.
21 The Honourable Mr Justice Leong, Chief Judge of the High Court, "Long-term Prison Sentence and
Parole" (2002) 7 Hong Kong Lawyer 39, 43.
22 Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance, ss 15(1) and 18.
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life sentence, make a report on matters relating to the person or the offence
for the purposes of reviewing the sentence in the future. Five years into his
sentence of imprisonment the mandatory life-sentenced prisoner receives his
first review from the board. Any report prepared by the trial judge will be
amongst the materials considered by the board.
As in the case of the discretionary life-sentenced prisoner, the board seeks,
in the review, to determine whether it should recommend the substitution of
a determinate sentence for the mandatory life sentence. If the board consid-
ers the prisoner rehabilitated, it may recommend substitution of an appropriate
determinate sentence. Similarly, if the Chief Executive accepts the
recommendation, the prisoner's release will usually follow shortly thereafter.
Recent Challenges to Indeterminate Sentences in Hong Kong
In Lau's case, the Court of Final Appeal was asked to consider whether the
mandatory life sentence of imprisonment in Hong Kong contravened Article
5(4) of the HKBoR. That Article provides:
"Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his re-
lease if the detention is not lawful."
The Article is extremely similar to Article 5(4) of the European Convention
on Human Rights (the Convention), contraventions of which have been the
basis for challenges in the English domestic courts and the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. That Article provides:
"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is
not lawful."
This Article has been interpreted by the ECHR in challenges to the United
Kingdom's domestic law as requiring that both mandatory and discretionary
life-sentenced prisoners have regular periodic access to a judicial tribunal af-
ter the minimum period of a life sentence has been served. " The minimum
period is called the "tariff' in the United Kingdom. The purpose of the access
23 Stafford v The United Kingdom, unrep., Application No 46295 of 1999 (European Court of Human
Rights, 28 May 2002) (hereinafter referred to as Stafford's case) and Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v The
United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 666 (hereinafter referred to as Thynne's case).
40 Amanda Whitfort (2003) HKLJ
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is to ensure that the lawfulness of a prisoner's continuing detention is
regularly reviewed by a body with the power to release him if necessary. The
rationale for requiring review after the minimum term has expired is that the
detention during the minimum period is based on the requirements of retri-
bution and deterrence, which will have been satisfied on the expiry of the
minimum term. Post-expiration detention can only be justified on the grounds
that the prisoner continues to present a danger to society."
This view is supported by Practice Direction (Crime: Life Sentences)" which
provides that a discretionary life sentence falls into two parts:
1 the relevant part which consists of the period of detention imposed for
punishment and deterrence taking into account the seriousness of the
offence; and
2 the remaining part of the sentence during which the prisoner's period
of detention will be governed by considerations of risk to the public.
The Court of Final Appeal in Lau's case observed that access to a judicial
tribunal under Article 5(4) is not required for mandatory life-sentenced
prisoners, because access only becomes necessary at the post tariff stage of
detention. The court found that because Hong Kong courts set no tariff for
mandatory life-sentenced prisoners, the equivalent Article in the HKBoR
was not engaged. No issue of possible unlawful detention can arise where
no tariff is set.26 In the United Kingdom, a tariff is set for mandatory life-
sentenced prisoners as well as those serving discretionary life sentences.
In the cases of Yau and Lai, Mr Justice Hartmann considered whether
section 12(2) of the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance contra-
vened Article 5(4) of the HKBoR. Section 12(2) requires that the board
must not conditionally release a prisoner before any minimum term set by a
trial judge under section 67B of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, or the
Chief Executive under section 67C, has expired. The judge ruled that section
12(2) was not in contravention of the requirement for access to a judicial
tribunal to assess the lawfulness of detention. The judge ruled that while the
board's powers are limited in not allowing conditional release prior to the
expiration of the minimum term, that minimum term is not the same as a
tariff. It does not expire in the same way as the tariff set in the United Kingdom.
In that jurisdiction, expiry of the tariff provides the prisoner with a legitimate
expectation of release by the Parole Board, as the only reason for his
continued detention would be continuing risk. Access to a judicial tribunal
for assessment of the continuing lawfulness of detention is necessary
24 Stafford's case, ibid., para 80.
25 [19931 1 WLR 223.
26 See n 1 above, p 189.
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post-expiration of tariff in the United Kingdom because continued detention
can only be justified on the basis of risk to the community. In Hong Kong,
the expiry of the minimum period does not give rise to any expectation be-
cause it will still be a matter for the board to assess whether to release the
prisoner on the basis of rehabilitation.
The decision in Yau's case recognised that there are fundamental differ-
ences between the tariff period as it is employed in the United Kingdom and
the minimum term in Hong Kong. In the United Kingdom, on completion of
the tariff term the prisoner is entitled to be released, subject only to consider-
ations of risk. In Hong Kong, the minimum term's completion is only one of
a broad range of matters to be considered before release. The court found the
other matters canvas the assessment of the offender's rehabilitation. The judge
also stated that, even if the inability to order conditional release prior to the
expiry of the minimum period was in contravention of Article 5(4) of the
HKBoR, prisoners still had recourse to the courts via the writ of habeas corpus
to challenge their continuing detention.
The court was also asked to consider whether the Chief Executive's role in
setting the minimum period in accordance with section 67C for those prison-
ers already detained at Her Majesty's pleasure or serving indeterminate
sentences in 1997 was in breach of Article 80 of the Basic Law. Article 80
provides:
"The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region at all levels
shall be the judiciary of the Region, exercising the judicial power of the
Region."
The applicants in Yau's case were both convicted of murder, one in 1987
and one in 1989. They were detained at Her Majesty's pleasure because they
were aged under 18 at the time of the offences. In 1997, when section 67C
was enacted, the Chief Executive set each of the applicants a minimum term
of imprisonment. The applicants argued that the Chief Executive's setting of
their minimum terms contravened Article 80 of the Basic Law.
The court found the Basic Law, as a constitutional document, follows the
Westminster model which separates the powers of the legislature, the execu-
tive and the judiciary. Judicial power is reserved to the judiciary.
The court ruled that the imposition of a punishment in a criminal matter
which includes the assessment of its severity is an integral part of the admin-
istration of justice and is therefore the exercise of judicial, not executive,
power. Setting a minimum term is part of the imposition of punishment and
an exercise of judicial power. In so far as section 67C reserved the determina-
tion of the minimum term to the Chief Executive, it offended against the
principle of separation of powers and Article 80 of the Basic Law. The judge
(2003) HKLJ
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recognised, however, that while the assessment of the minimum term does
not dictate absolutely the final length of the sentence to be served, it does,
critically, primarily address and primarily determine the period which must
be served to reflect the imperatives of retribution and deterrence. It would be
artificial to suggest it does not to a material degree dictate the severity of
sentence. The judge stated: "the fixing of a period of time that must be served
by an offender to extinguish the retributive and deterrent elements of his
sentence is an exercise in determining the punishment for that individual
offender."" He was satisfied that "section 67C, whatever its form, in sub-
stance gives the Chief Executive the power to exercise what is inherently a
judicial power."" The court declared that the Chief Executive's power under
section 67C to set minimum terms was inconsistent with Article 80 of the
Basic Law and was therefore invalid."
The ruling referred to the judgment of Lord Diplock giving the well cited
opinion of the Privy Council in Hinds v the Queen: "What parliament cannot
do, consistently with the separation of powers, is to transfer from the judiciary
to any executive body ... a discretion to determine the severity of the punish-
ment to be inflicted upon an individual member of a class of offenders."30
The Administration of Indeterminate Sentences in the United Kingdom
A conviction for murder in the United Kingdom carries a mandatory sen-
tence of life imprisonment." A discretionary life sentence is also available as
the maximum sentence for more serious crimes such as attempted murder,
robbery and rape. As in Hong Kong, life imprisonment does not generally
mean that the prisoner, whether serving a mandatory or discretionary life
sentence, will spend the term of his natural life in gaol. The Secretary of
State has adopted a policy over the past 20 years whereby he sets a tariff
period, in consultation with the judiciary, as the minimum term required
before qualification for consideration for release. The practice of consulta-
tion concerning the earliest date of release for life-sentenced prisoners has a
long and important history.32 The 1965 Murder (Abolition of the Death
Penalty) Act provided that the Home Secretary must consult with the Lord
Chief Justice and, where possible, the trial judge, before releasing a prisoner
sentenced for murder. The 1967 Criminal Justice Act specified not only that
27 See n 2 above, para 63.
28 Ibid., para 67.
29 Ibid., para 128.
30 [1977] AC 195, p 226.
31 Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965.
32 For a detailed discussion of release procedures in the United Kingdom, see G. Richardson, Law Pro-
cess and Custody: Prisoners and Patients (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), pp 194-213.
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the Home Secretary must consult with the judiciary, but also that the Parole
Board must make a favourable recommendation before any life-sentenced
prisoner could be released. At that time, there was no set date for the first
consideration of parole by the Parole Board, but in practice the case was usu-
ally first reviewed seven years into the sentence. 3 By 1973, the period was
reduced to require review after three to four years.
In 1983, the Home Secretary adopted a new policy to set the tariffs for
both mandatory and discretionary life prisoners. He announced that three to
four years after conviction for life he would consult the judiciary to deter-
mine a tariff which would reflect the minimum period necessary to be served
to satisfy the aims of retribution and deterrence. The tariff set is critical, be-
cause three years before its expiry is the first date at which a prisoner can seek
review of his detention and he cannot be released until the expiry of the
tariff.
This new practice was criticised in R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Handscomb.5 In that case, the Home Secretary was criticised
for waiting three to four years before consulting the judiciary about an appro-
priate tariff. In response to the judgment, the practice was changed and the trial
judges were asked to provide their views on tariff immediately after conviction.
Their views, however, were not considered binding on the Home Secretary.
The Home Office determined the actual tariff, although in practice the Secre-
tary followed the trial judges' recommendations regarding discretionary
life-sentenced prisoners. He did not, however, consider he was bound to follow
their views in the case of mandatory life-sentenced prisoners. In fact, in many
cases he raised the tariffs of mandatory life-sentenced prisoners.16
The Discretionary Life-sentenced Prisoner (United Kingdom)
The difference in treatment formed the basis for early challenges made to the
ECHR by both mandatory and discretionary life-sentenced prisoners. In re-
sponse to the ECHR ruling in Thynne's case, section 34 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1991 was enacted. In that decision the ECHR criticised the Home Sec-
retary for setting the tariffs for discretionary life prisoners and maintained
that Article 5(4) of the convention required that a prisoner compulsorily
detained have regular access to a "court" to determine the continued lawful-
ness of his detention. The applicants in Thynne's case had complained there
was no judicial procedure to assess the continuing lawfulness of their discre-
tionary life sentences after their tariffs had expired. The ECHR ruled that, on
3 House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment (HL 78-1)
(London: HMSO, 1989), part 8.
Ibid.
3 (1987) 86 Crim App Rep 59.
36 See n 33 above, paras 154-156.
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expiry of his tariff, a prisoner had served the period required for retribution
and deterrence and must be entitled to regular re-assessment of his continued
detention by a "court" with the power to order his release." After the expiry
of the punitive period (the tariff), continued detention could only be justi-
fied on the basis of the prisoner's perceived dangerousness. As the level of
danger posed by a prisoner will change with time, there must be periodic
assessments to ensure that the lawfulness of his continued detention, based
on risk of harm to the community, remains intact.
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 accordingly removed the power of the
Home Secretary not only to set the tariffs for discretionary life-sentenced
prisoners, but to insist on their post-tariff detention where the Parole Board
had recommended release. The duty of the Secretary to release a discretion-
ary life prisoner on the recommendation of the Parole Board now appears as
section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. In accordance with section
34(4) of the 1991 Act the board must to be satisfied, before recommending
release, that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the
prisoner should be detained.
If a prisoner is released he is on licence and is subject to recall on a breach
of licence until his death." A licence may involve special conditions. If he is
not recommended for release, a prisoner has the right to a further review
every two years, but the board may recommend another review at an earlier
date. Most prisoners released by the board are already held in open prisons or
pre-release hostels. 9
The Mandatory Life-sentenced Prisoner (United Kingdom)
The decision in Thynne's case did not assist prisoners sentenced to mandatory
life sentences in the United Kingdom. In 1994, the ECHR made it clear in
the decision of Wynne v The United Kingdom* that the ruling in Thynne's case
did not apply to mandatory life-sentenced prisoners. The ECHR found that a
mandatory life sentence has an ongoing punitive purpose rather than a puni-
tive and protective one. Accordingly, at the time of writing, the Home
Secretary may still set the tariff for mandatory life-sentenced prisoners after
consultation with the judiciary, although he will allow the prisoner to make
written representations prior to fixing the tariff.4 ' A whole life tariff has been
considered appropriate in only the most heinous of circumstances. 42 The
imposition of such a tariff is based on the rationale that the requirements
37 Thynne's case (n 23 above), para 76.
38 Criminal Justice Act 1991, s 37(3).
3 Lord Windlesham, Responses to Crime Vol 3: Legislating with the Tide (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996), p 341.
40 (1994) 19 EHRR 333.
41 Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [199411 AC 531.
42 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindey [2001] 1 AC.
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of retribution and deterrence can never be satisfied, although the prisoner's
continued detention must still be subject to periodic review
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 also allows the Secretary of State the final
decision on the release of a mandatory life prisoner after consultation with
the judiciary and recommendation of the Parole Board." In contrast, legisla-
tion intended to comply with the ruling in Thynne's case has removed his
power to veto a decision of the Parole Board to release a discretionary life-
sentenced prisoner since 1991. When the Human Rights Act 1998 came into
force in the United Kingdom in October 2000, challenges began to be made
to the role of the Secretary of State in deciding when to release mandatory
life-sentenced prisoners.
As the ECHR concluded in Stafford's case in 2002:
"... with the wider recognition of the need to develop and apply, in rela-
tion to mandatory life prisoners, judicial procedures reflecting standards
of independence, fairness and openness, the continuing role of the Secre-
tary of State in fixing the tariff and in deciding on the prisoners release
following its expiry, has become increasingly difficult to reconcile with
the notion of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary,
a notion which has assumed growing importance in the case-law of the
Court.""
The ECHR ruled that the decision in Wynne's case, that a mandatory life
sentence constituted punishment for life, did not reflect the real position in
the domestic criminal justice system for mandatory life prisoners. The court
found that the punitive element of the sentence could be satisfied in all but
the most exceptional cases," and after punishment had been exhausted, the
only ground for continued detention was dangerousness and risk. Where the
Parole Board assessed that detention on the basis of satisfying punishment,
dangerousness and risk could no longer be maintained, Article 5(4) of the
Convention required that the board should have the power to order the re-
lease of mandatory life-sentenced prisoners. As the power to make the final
decision for release lay with the Secretary of State, the ECHR ruled the United
Kingdom was in breach of the Convention."6 Following Stafford's case, the
House of Lords has now ruled in Ex parte Anderson 7 that the Home Secretary's
power to reject the Parole Board's recommendations for release in the post-
tariff period is incompatible with the prisoners' rights under the Convention.
43 Criminal justice Act 1991, 35(2).
44 Note 23 above, para 78.
" See n 42 above.
46 Stafford's case (n 23 above), paras 87-90.
4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Anderson [20021 UKHL 46 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Anderson's case).
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In response to this ruling the Home Secretary has agreed to legislate to ensure
all tariffs are fixed by the judges and the Parole Board has the final determina-
tion in the release of all life sentenced prisoners.
Applying the Lessons Learned in the United Kingdom to Hong Kong's
Administration of the Indeterminate Sentence
Several decisions of the ECHR were referred to in the Court of Final Appeal's
judgment in Lau's case, including Stafford's case, although the court noted
that the judgment in Stafford was published after the conclusion of argument
in Lau's case. The particular importance of Stafford's case, and now Anderson's
case, is that both the ECHR and the House of Lords have unanimously ruled
that the English Home Secretary has no power to deny murderers' release
from gaol once the Parole Board has recommended release. The rulings state
that to detain a prisoner under such circumstances would violate Article 5(4)
of the Convention.
The Court of Final Appeal was invited in Lau's case to find that the man-
datory life sentence breached Article 5(4) of the HKBoR because a prisoner
was not able to contest the lawfulness of his continued detention in a judicial
tribunal. In its ruling, the court recognised that when the offence of murder
had a mandatory life sentence attached to it the legislature intended that a
statutory regime would be put in place to review individually each mandatory
sentence.48 The court observed that it w'as on the basis of the administration's
assurances that the legislation necessary for such a scheme would be intro-
duced that the mandatory sentence was passed."* The court stated that the
scheme is now embodied in the Long Term Prison Sentences Review
Ordinance.
The court held, however, that the position in Hong Kong under Article
5(4) of the HKBoR is different to those in the United Kingdom and under
Article 5(4) of the Convention. The court noted that contravention of the
Convention occurs in the absence of examination by a judicial tribunal at
the expiry of the post-tariff period where fresh issues of possible unlawfulness
of detention can arise. This observation, together with the ECHR's ruling in
Stafford's case and the decision of the House of Lords in Anderson's case, has
relevance for Hong Kong's system of administering discretionary life sentences.
The power provided to the Chief Executive to continue the detention of a
discretionary life-sentenced prisoner after his minimum period has been served
and a recommendation of the Board for a determinate sentence and remis-
sion has been made would almost certainly be in violation of the HKBoR. To
See n 1 above, p 176.
l [bid.
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make a recommendation for a determinate sentence the Board must have
decided the prisoner is rehabilitated; his minimum period reflecting that ret-
ribution and deterrence has been served, and all other aspects of his
rehabilitation, including any potential risk to the community, are satisfied.
Where such a recommendation is made, the Chief Executive's power to veto
the board's finding must be in contravention of Article 5(4) of the HKBoR
and Article 80 of the Basic Law.
However, in Lau's case, the court was addressing the issue of whether there
would be violation in relation to mandatory life-sentenced prisoners. The
court ruled that there was no violation because, for mandatory life-sentenced
prisoners, no minimum period is set, so no fresh issue of lawfulness of deten-
tion arises. The court did not address, however, the ultimate question of
whether the Chief Executive's overriding power to effect release after a
favourable recommendation from the board was consistent with the HKBoR.
Between June 1997 and June 2000 the board met oi 15 occasions and
conducted 1,768 reviews. 0 Of the 1,768 reviews, it considered 250 prisoners
with mandatory life sentences and 38 with discretionary life sentences. Of
these 288 cases it made 15 recommendations to the Chief Executive that
determinate sentences be substituted for indeterminate ones. Of the 15
recommendations, 14 related to mandatory life-sentenced prisoners and one
related to a discretionary life-sentenced prisoner. The Chief Executive adopted
all 15 recommendations.5
To make recommendations for determinate sentences, the granting of
which is the only route by which a life-sentenced prisoner can be released,52
the board must have concluded that the rehabilitation of those 14 mandatory
life prisoners' sentences had been achieved. Once the board is so satisfied,
the prisoners' continued detention, at the Chief Executive's discretion, can-
not be justified without a violation of Article 5(4) of the HKBoR and Article
80 of the Basic Law. The sentencing aims have been satisfied, whether the
court calls the period required to satisfy the requirements of punishment,
deterrence, risk of dangerousness and rehabilitation a "tariff' or not. It would
be unnecessary to provide the mandatory life-sentenced prisoner with a right
to review five years into his sentence (and every two years thereafter) unless
the legislature intended periodic re-assessment of the continued need for
detention. Where the need for detention is judged by the board to have expired,
the HKBoR and the Basic Law require that the board has the power to order
50 See n 12 above, p 19.
51 Letter from the Secretary, Long-Term Prison Sentences Review Board to the author, 10 July 2002.
52 Release on conditional release order cannot be classified as release from detention for the purposes of
compliance with the HKBoR because the order is for a limited period and is used by the board as a
precursor to determining whether a prisoner should receive a recommendation to the Chief Execu-
tive for the substitution of a determinate sentence.
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release. It is immaterial that the Chief Executive adopted all 15 recommen-
dations of the board; what is important is that he had the power not to do so.
Section 15(1)(a) of the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance does
not allow the board the final determination to grant or deny release of the
life-sentenced prisoner after the purpose of his detention has been assessed as
satisfied. As such, it may be invalid due to inconsistency with the HKBoR
and the Basic Law.
Conclusion
In Stafford's case the ECHR warned against trying to reconcile the continuing
role of the Secretary of State, in deciding on a prisoner's release date after a
recommendation of the Parole Board, with the notion of separation of powers.
In Anderson's case the House of Lords confirmed that the Secretary's role was
incompatible with the obligations of the United Kingdom under the
Convention. In Yau's case the Hong Kong High Court recognised that the
Chief Executive's assessment of a minimum term for indeterminate-sentenced
prisoners offended against Article 80 of the Basic Law. It is artificial to sug-
gest that because Hong Kong does not call any minimum period specified a
"tariff' there can be no issue of unlawful detention after the expiration of that
period, or any other period, which the board considers satisfies the aims of
rehabilitation. The ECHR focused on the United Kingdom's tariff system in
order to fix a point after which detention could become unlawful because the
aims of punishment and risk of danger had been satisfied. Similarly, in Hong
Kong, in the case of both mandatory and discretionary life-sentenced prisoners,
the board determines the point at which the aims of punishment and the
needs of rehabilitation are met. It is at that point that a recommendation for
a determinate sentence is made to the Chief Executive. It is at that point the
board's powers under the Long Term Prison Sentences Review Ordinance are
lacking.
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